Civil Rule 53: An Enabling Act Challenge (Federal Practice and Procedure Symposiusm Honoring Charles Alan Wright) by Cooper, Edward H.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1998
Civil Rule 53: An Enabling Act Challenge (Federal
Practice and Procedure Symposiusm Honoring
Charles Alan Wright)
Edward H. Cooper
University of Michigan Law School, coopere@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/109
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cooper, Edward H. "Civil Rule 53: An Enabling Act Challenge (Federal Practice and Procedure Symposiusm Honoring Charles Alan
Wright)." Tex. L. Rev. 76, no. 7 (1998): 1607-35.
Civil Rule 53: An Enabling Act Challenge
Edward H. Cooper*
The Judicial Conference of the United States is charged by statute to
"carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general
rules of practice and procedure," recommending desirable changes to the
Supreme Court.' The Rules Enabling Act,2 which describes the Supreme
Court's role, further provides that the Judicial Conference is to be assisted
in this task by a "standing committee on rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence" ;3 the standing committee in turn reviews "each recommendation
of any other committees" appointed to advise it.4
Charles Alan Wright has been directly involved in the rulemaking pro-
cess for much of his life. As with so many other things, he cares passion-
ately about it. He cares that it be done carefully, and that the products be
as good as they can be made. This Symposium contribution is designed to
ask others to lend a hand with one small and discrete part of the larger
enterprise.
The first part of this paper introduces a Reporter's draft of a revised
Civil Rule 53. The purpose is in large part to stimulate interest in the
draft. It is important to gain advice on the questions whether revision of
Rule 53 should be undertaken during the next several years, and whether
this first draft moves in the right directions. But a secondary purpose is
* ThomasM. Cooley Professorof Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1961, Dartmouth College;
L.L.B. 1964, Harvard University.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). The relevant portion of the statute states:
The Conference shall also carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the
general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the
Supreme Court for the other courts of the United States pursuant to law. Such changes
in and additions to those rules as the Conference may deem desirable to promote
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and
the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay shall be recommended by the
Conference from time to time to the Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption,
modification or rejection, in accordance with law.
Id.
2. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074
(1994)).
3. Id. § 2073(b).
4. Id. Section 2075 includes a parallel provision for adopting bankruptcy rules. See id. § 2075.
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to use the draft to illustrate how daunting is the Judicial Conference's task
to carry on a continuous study of the Civil Rules. If it is safe to assume
that the Rule 53 endeavor could avoid some of the most disturbing perils
that beset other rule topics, it nevertheless encounters other difficulties that
are all too common.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that this draft is exactly
what it purports to be, a Reporter's draft. It has been considered by the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee only as an illustration of issues that might
be addressed by a revised Rule 53. The Committee has not reviewed any
of these questions, much less approved any of the answers even for tenta-
tive advancement. And, as will be reflected in these introductory
comments, even the Reporter is far from confident about many of the
positions taken with all the seeming authority of dispositive drafting. The
central purpose of this exercise is to seek advice, not to advance this draft
as a perfected model.
The Advisory Committee was prompted to study Rule 53 by sugges-
tions from advisory groups formed to develop Civil Justice Expense and
Delay Reduction plans.' The common core of the suggestions was that
district courts have come to rely on special masters in many circumstances
not clearly covered by Rule 53, and that Rule 53 should be amended both
to legitimate and to encourage these practices.6 The Committee reacted
cautiously. Noting that masters seem to be used for general pretrial
purposes and for settlement, to manage discovery, and to help in imple-
menting or even formulating complex decrees, the Committee considered
the possibility of adding special master provisions to Rule 16, to the
discovery rules, and to the rules governing judgments. A draft Rule 16.1
governing pretrial masters was prepared.7 The Rule 16.1 draft led in turn
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 provided for implementation of a "civil justice expense and delay reduc-
tion plan" by "each United States district court." Id. § 471. Sections 472 and 478 required
appointment of an advisory group in each district. Id. §§ 472, 478. Almost all of these provisions
expired on December 1, 1997. Sections 471 and 476 continue to be in effect by virtue of Pub. L. No.
105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 1173 (1997).
6. As the Civil Rules Advisory Committee reported in May 1993:
Advisory groups for at least two Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction plans have
suggested changes in Rule 53 to encourage use of special masters. The District of New
Jersey believes that the Rule 53(b) provision that references are to be the exception, not
the rule, unduly limits innovative use of masters to resolve complicated and protracted
discovery disputes. Use of masters should be encouraged so that judges and magistrate
judges can tend to other matters. The Northern District of Georgia wants to encourage
use of masters to try cases, to clarify the power of the court to initiate appointment of a
master in complex cases, and to establish a pilot program under which the master would
be paid out of government funds if the parties agreed to select a master from a court-
approved list.
Judicial Conference of the United States, Agenda Item V-B of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 10
(May 3-5, 1993) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
7. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Agenda Item VI of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee (April 28-29, 1994) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
1608 [Vol. 76:1607
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to a draft that generated a revised Rule 53 governing trial masters and new
Rules 53.1 and 53.2 dealing with pretrial and post-trial masters. These
approaches were consolidated in the draft Rule 53 that is set out below.
The general topic and successive drafts were considered at four suc-
cessive Advisory Committee meetings.' The range of topics covered by
the discussions is reflected in the scope of the draft Rule 53 and the draft
Note. In the end, it was concluded that there is no apparent need for
imminent action. The draft remains an information-study item that may
become the foundation for further development if the need should become
more apparent.
The Rule 53 experience points up in several ways the difficulty of
carrying on a continuous study of the Civil Rules. One of the most impor-
tant tasks is to find out what is actually happening in contemporary
practice. There is ample anecdotal information suggesting that masters are
used much more often for pretrial and post-trial purposes than for the trial
functions contemplated by Rule 53. An amusing illustration was provided
by the reactions of several of the law professors who were asked to review
the draft-they were surprised to discover that masters ever are used for
trial purposes. It is difficult, however, to put this information in anything
like rigorous form. Particular difficulty arises from exotic practices that
combine the role of court-appointed expert witness with the master role,
appoint an expert as an adviser to the judge, or explore still different roles.
Not only is the information indistinct, it also is sufficiently diffuse to
challenge anyone who might undertake empirical study. The Federal
Judicial Center, in its role as research arm of the federal judiciary, has
undertaken many helpful studies in support of Advisory Committee
inquiries. Before it can be asked to design a study, however, the nature
and scope of the inquiry must be determined. And framing an empirical
study of special master practices is likely to be a major undertaking.
Putting aside the more adventurous uses of masters and similar judicial
adjuncts, even a confident judgment that masters are frequently appointed
for purposes not contemplated by Rule 53 need not dictate revision.
Revision, to be sure, can regularize and legitimate present practice.
Revision, however, can mistakenly eliminate desirable practices and choke
off development of new practices. There is much to be said for moving
with caution when there are few signs that serious problems demand
correction. The law of unintended consequences offers ample reason. No
matter how carefully present practice is studied, and no matter how
8. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules 19-22 (Oct. 20-21, 1994) (on fMle with the Texas Law Review); Judicial Conference of the United
States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure 26-28 (Apr. 28-29, 1994) (on
file with the Texas Law Review); Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure 13-17 (Oct. 21-23, 1994) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
1998] 1609
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carefully a rule is constructed and reviewed throughout the very careful
rulemaking process,9 adversary lawyers will seek to bend every possible
nuance to their own purposes. In addition, the Civil Rules have been much
changed of late." The Committee is frequently advised that bench and
bar find it difficult to absorb constant changes. This advice has been taken
to heart, and provides another reason for reluctance in approaching Rule
53.
If these common problems support a cautious approach, other frequent
problems do not seem to bedevil Rule 53 revision. The Advisory
Committee has not been shy about approaching issues that are highly
9. The ordinary pace of the rulemaking process can be measured by working back from the provi-
sion in 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) that the Supreme Court is to transmit a proposed rule to Congress "not
later than May 1 of the year in which" the rule is to "become effective." The rule takes effect "no
earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by
law." 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994). The Judicial Conference regularly meets in Septemberand March.
Because a March recommendation would leave only a few weeks for Supreme Court consideration
before the May 1 deadline, ordinarily a matter of any importance should be placed on the September
Judicial Conference agenda, more than one year before the proposed effective date.
At this point, it is useful to go back to the beginning of the process. The process is described
in the Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure. See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the United States, Request for Comment on
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy and Criminal Procedure
by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 83-90 (Aug. 1997) (on file with the Texas Law
Review). The Advisory Committee must recommend a proposed rule to the Standing Committee for
publication. The period for public comment and one or more hearings ordinarily is six months. After
the period concludes, the Advisory Committee considers the comments and testimony. If the conclu-
sion is that the proposed rule can go forward in a form that has not been so much changed as to require
a second round of publication and comment, it can be recommended for adoption. The Standing
Committee then reviews the recommendation. The Advisory Committees ordinarily meet in the fall
and spring. The Standing Committee ordinarily meets in the winter and late spring, gearing its sched-
ule to the Judicial Conference schedule. All of this translates into a schedule in which, moving at the
fastest ordinary speed, the Advisory Committee could consider and recommend a rule at a meeting in
March or April. The Standing Committee could approve publication in June. Publication likely would
occur in August, closing the comment period at the end of January or in February. The Advisory
Committee could consider the comments and testimony at its March or April meeting. The Standing
Committee could approve in June. The Judicial Conference could recommend the rule to the Supreme
Court in September, the Court could transmit the rule to Congress by May 1, and Congress could allow
the rule to take effect on December 1, more than two and one-half years after initial consideration by
the Advisory Committee.
Of course many proposals require lengthier initial consideration by the Advisory Committee, and
some require more than one round of publication. Revision of Rule 23, the class-action rule, is an
illustration. The Advisory Committee began to study Rule 23 in 1991. In June 1997 it recommended
two changes to the Standing Committee, which submitted one change to the Judicial Conference and
remanded the other for further consideration by the Advisory Committee. See Judicial Conference of
the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 16-21 (June
19-20, 1997) (on file with the Texas Law Review). If all goes well, the one change-creation of a per-
missive interlocutory appeal procedure for orders granting or denying class certification-can take effect
on December 1, 1998. Any further changes will require still further years of effort.
10. Supreme Court Orders amending the Rules in 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1997 are set out
in 134 F.R.D. 525 (1991), 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993), 161 F.R.D. 149 (1995), 167 F.R.D. 209 (1996),
and 171 F.R.D. 679 (1997).
1610
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controversial within the bench and bar, and occasionally beyond. The
lengthy study of class actions is one example."' The newly launched
study of discovery 2 -- a topic that has barely been off the Committee's
agenda for the last thirty years-is another. Other recent examples include
the proposals to amend Rule 47 to establish a right of party participation
in voir dire examination of prospective jurors, 3 and to amend Rule 48 to
restore the twelve-person jury. 4  Substantial controversy has even
attended a still-pending proposal to clarify the procedure and standards for
modifying or vacating discovery protective orders. It does not seem likely
that Rule 53 will rouse similar passions, although the special master
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's suggest that
specific subject-matter areas may bring the topic into the political arena.'
6
The Rule 53 draft illustrates other aspects of the revision process that
are not so much problems as continuing choices. Perhaps the first of these
is the decision whether to seek assistance outside the Committee. For this
draft, great help was provided by Judge Wayne Brazil, who was a member
of the Advisory Committee when Rule 53 first appeared on the agenda.
In addition, half a dozen law professors with identifiable interests in the
topic were consulted. This sort of informal consultation is a useful way of
identifying topics that should be considered, and it seems to have few risks
if approached as a request for questions, not answers.
When the time comes to draft a concrete model for Committee
consideration, the breadth of the model must be considered. This is the
11. The depth of the Advisory Committee's consideration of Rule 23 is reflected in the four vol-
umes of working papers published in 1997. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Rules Committee Support Office, Working Papers of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on
Proposed Amendments to Civil Rule 23 (May 1, 1997).
12. See Symposium, Conference on Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517 (1998).
13. Judicial Conference of the United States, Request for Comment on Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, Criminal Procedure and
Evidence by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 128-29 (Sept. 1995).
14. Id. at 134.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994).
16. See id. § 3626(f). Inferences as to the nature of legislative concerns may be drawn from var-
ious provisions of the Act. Paragraph (1) authorizes appointment of a special master "who shall be
disinterested and objective and who will give due regard to the public safety." Id. § 3626(f)(1)(A).
Appointment during "the remedial phase of the action" is authorized "only upon a finding that the
remedial phase will be sufficiently complex to warrant the appointment." Id. § 3626(f)(1)(B).
Paragraph (2) provides that "the defendant institution" and "the plaintiff" are each to submit a list of
"no more than 5 persons to serve as a special master"; each can remove up to 3 persons from the
opposing party's list, and the court is to select the master from those remaining. Id. § 3626(f)(2)(A);
see id. § 3626(f)(2)(B)-(C). Paragraph (3) provides a right of interlocutory appeal from the selection
of the special master, "or the ground ofpartiality." Id. § 3626(0(3). Paragraph (4) sets compensation
at "an hourly rate not greater than the hourly rate established under section 3006A for payment of
court-appointed counsel." Id. § 3626(f)(4). Under paragraph (5), the appointment is to be reviewed
every six months, and it cannot extend "beyond the termination of relief." Id. § 3626(f)(5).
Paragraph (6) prohibits the special master from making findings or communications ex pane. See id.
§ 3626(f)(6)(A)-(B). HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  1611 1997-1998
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first comprehensive draft. It seems better that the first draft touch on as
many real issues as have been identified. This approach not only keeps the
issues in mind, but it also suggests what a solution might look like. This
approach is exaggerated in the draft Note. Assertions are made about
many things that have not been discussed by the Committee, and at times
they are made without any real feeling whether the assertion is right. The
purpose is to stimulate discussion, not to dispose of the issue. Yet there
are risks even in this modest purpose. Discussion of important practical
issues may be distracted by the fascination of esoteric issues that have little
connection to workaday practice. There is a temptation to adopt elegant
but abstract solutions that rest on theory, not evidence, and that may
address nonexistent problems or provide wrong answers. Not every identi-
fiable issue should be addressed; drawing the line of exclusion may itself
be a challenge.
The draft Note illustrates another general issue. The purpose of the
Note attached to the final rule, if one emerges, is uncertain. There is a
constant temptation to elaborate and to justify the provisions of the rule.
As with many drafting enterprises, the temptation extends to addressing
issues not answered by the rule itself. And a note prepared in advance of
public testimony and comment may become a vehicle for persuasion,
explaining the proposed changes in terms designed to win support as well
as to educate. The result may be a lengthy note. Length itself is a
problem to many, who prefer succinct notes that can be consulted quickly
by lawyers who need to make snap decisions. Lengthy notes also may take
on the aura of "legislative history," a label that carries more suspicion than
helpful promise to many contemporary ears. Yet a complex rule that
addresses a wide variety of problems and adheres to the rule tradition of
relying on district court discretion invites a lengthy note explanation. This
draft Note is certainly long. It is a fair question whether that signifies a
need to add still greater detail to the, rule itself, or perhaps instead to cut
back on the ambitious sweep of the rule.
Of course all of these questions are less important than the basic
question whether the particular rule should be revised at all. Even if the
present Rule 53 does not reflect or speak to increasingly diverse uses of
masters as judicial adjuncts, there may be little need to act quickly. There
are few visible signs of distress. If satisfactory practices are evolving in
the vicinity of Rule 53, even if not under its aegis, it may be better to
allow continuing evolution that will provide a stronger foundation for a
future rule that catches up to reality. The common-law process, supported
as much by unarticulated notions of inherent power as by Rule 53, may
generate better wisdom than a premature attempt to regularize practices by
formal rule.
Even if revision should be undertaken, the scope of the project must
be determined. This draft may fail to address important issues, may deal
1612 [Vol. 76:1607
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with trivial matters, and may give wrong answers. Some of the issues that
raised particular doubts during the drafting and informal consultation
processes were identified for the Committee by underlining and redlining.
These markers might properly be extended to the entire draft, including
many of the provisions taken directly from the present rule. Rather than
attempt to guide discussion, however, it better suits my purposes to frame
a more demanding challenge: Examine the draft. Reflect carefully on it.
Consider the questionable provisions, and dream up the significant
omissions. Then, armed with a catalogue of errors, think again about the
worth of the enterprise. Is there reason to address Rule 53, and to address
it now, or should the project remain suspended into the indefinite future?
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  1613 1997-1998
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APPENDIX: RULE 53. MASTERS: REPORTER'S DRAFT, SEPT. 25, 1994
(a) Appointing.
(1) A court may appoint a master only:
(A) if the parties consent, or
(B) if the master's duties cannot be adequately performed by an
available district judge or magistrate judge [of the district],
and-if the master is to exercise the powers described in
subdivision (b)(8) or (9)-(i) in an action to be tried by a
jury, if the issues are extraordinarily complicated and
consideration of the master's report is likely to substantially
assist the jury, or (ii) in an action to be tried to the court, if
some exceptional condition requires reference to a master.
(2) The master must not have a relationship to the parties, counsel,
action, or court that creates an actual or apparent conflict of
interest unless the parties consent to appointment of a particular
person. A meter Pprgh k of tl e Potn
(b) Master's duties. The court may appoint a master to:
(1) mediate or otherwise facilitate settlement;
(2) formulate a [disclosure or] discovery plan; supervise [disclosure
or] discovery; make [disclosure or] discovery orders under Rules
26 through 31, 32(d)(4), 33 through 36, and 45; make
recommendations [to the court] for orders under Rules 26
through 36 and 45; make orders under Rule 37(a) or (g); or make
recommendations [to the court] for orders under Rule 37;
(3) conduct conferences and make orders or recommendations for
orders under Rule 16;
(4) hear and determine any other pretrial motion, except a motion:
(A) for injunctive relief,
(B) to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
(C) for judgment on the pleadings,
(D) to strike any claim or defense,
(E) for involuntary dismissal, transfer, or remand,
(F) for summary judgment,
(G) to certify, dismiss, or approve settlement of a class action,
or
(H) to establish for trial under Evidence Rule 104 the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence;
1614 [Vol. 76:1607
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(5) conduct hearings and make proposed findings and
recommendations for disposition of a motion described in
paragraph 4;
(6) manage other pretrial proceedings;
(7) assist in coordinating separate proceedings pending before the
court or in other courts, state or federal;
(8) assist the court in discharging its trial duties in a nonjury case;
(9) preside over an evidentiary hearing and:
(A) report the evidence to the court in a nonjury action;
(B) recommend findings of fact and conclusions of law; or
(C) make findings of fact or conclusions of law in a nonjury
action, subject to review as provided in subdivision (i);
(10) conduct ministerial matters of account;
(11) assist in framing an injunction when the parties have not been
able to provide sufficient assistance;
(12) assist in supervising enforcement of a complex decree;
(13) assist in administering an award to multiple claimants;
(14) conduct independent investigations to assist in framing an
injunctive order or in enforcing a decree; or
(15) perform :if duties agreed to by the parties.
(c) Order Appointing Master.
(1) Hearing. The court must give the parties notice and an
opportunity for hearing before appointing a master. Apr
(2) Contents. The order appointing a master must direct the master
to proceed with all reasonable diligence and must state a."."a.ly
(A) the master's name[, business address, and numbers for
telephone and other electronic communications];
(B) the master's duties under subdivision (b);
(C) any limits on the master's authority under subdivisions (e)
and (f);
(D) the dates by which the master must first meet with the
parties, make interim and final reports to the court, and
complete the assigned duties;
(E) the circumstances[, if any,] in which the master may
communicate ex parte with the court or a party;
(F) the time limits, procedures, and standards for reviewing the
master's orders and recommendations;
[(G) any bond required of a master who is not a United States
magistrate judge;] and
(H) the his." ISi.11 procedure for fixing the master's
compensation under subdivision (j).
1998] 1615
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(3) Amendment. The order appointing a master may be amended at
any time [after notice to the parties].
(d) Master's Powers. Unless expressly limited by the appointing order,
a master may regulate all proceedings and take all measures necessary
or proper to perform efficiently the duties assigned under subdivision
(b).
(e) Master's Authority. Unless limited by the appointing order, a master
has authority to:
(1) set and give notice of reasonable dates and times for meetings of
the parties, hearings, and other proceedings;
(2) proceed in the absence of any party who fails to appear after
receiving actual notice under paragraph (1), or-in the master's
discretion-adjourn the proceedings;
(3) hold hearings under subdivision (f); and
(4) do all things necessary or proper for f.i.fif d efficient
performance of the master's duties.
(f) Hearings. When a master i .:i~dt conduct hearings:
(1) the parties or the master may compel witnesses to provide
evidence by subpoena under Rule 45, and the master may compel
a party to provide evidence without resort to Rule 45;
(2) the master may put the witnesses-on oath;
(3) the parties and the master may examine the witnesses;
(4) the master may rule on the admissibility of evidence;
(5) the master must make a record of excluded evidence as provided
in the Federal Rules of Evidence for a court sitting without a jury
if requested by a party or directed by the court;
(6) the master may impose the noncontempt consequences, penalties,
and remedies provided in Rules 37 and 45 on a party who fails
to appear, testify, or produce evidence; and
(7) the master may recommend to the court sanctions against a
nonparty witness, or contempt sanctions against a party, who fails
to appear, testify, or produce evidence.
(g) Master's Orders. A master who makes an order must file the order
and promptly serve a copy on each party. The clerk must enter the
order on the docket.
(h) Master's Reports. A master must report to the court as required by
the order of appointment, and may repot on any oth.. matter. Before
filing a report, the master may submit a draft to counsel for all parties
and receive their suggestions. The master must:
(1) file the report;
(2) promptly serve a copy of the #W report on each party; and
(3) file with the report any relevant exhibits and a transcript of any
relevant proceedings and evidence.
[Vol. 76:16071616
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(i) Action on Master's Order, Report, or Recommendations.
(1) Time and Hearing. A motion to review a master's order, or
objections to-or a motion to adopt-a master's report or
recommendations, must be filed within 10 days from the time the
order or the report is served unless the court sets a different time.
The court must afford opportunity for a hearing, and may receive
evidence.
(2) Action. In acting on a master's order, report, or
recommendations, the court may:
(A) adopt or affirm it;
(B) modify it;
(C) wholly or partly reject or reverse it; or
(D) resubmit it to the master with instructions.
(3) Fact Findings. The court in a nonjury case may set aside a
master's fact findings or recommendations for fact findings only
if clearly erroneous, unless:
(A) the order of appointment provides a more demanding
standard of review, or
(B) the parties stipulate that the master's findings will be final.
(4) Jury Issue Findings. A trial master's findings on issues to be
tried to a jury are admissible as evidence and may be read to the
jury unless the court excludes them in its discretion or for legal
error.
(5) Legal Questions. The court must iadependen4 decide de. W.0v
questions of law raised by a master's order, report, or
recommendations, unless the parties stipulate that the master's
disposition will be final.
[(6) Discretion. Alternative 1. The court may establish standards for
reviewing other acts or recommendations of a master atthe time
of review eF by order under (c)(2)(F).]
[(6) Discretion. Alternative 2. The court may set aside a master's
ruling on a matter of procedural discretion only for an abuse of
discretion.]
(j) Compensation.
(1) Fixing Compensation. The court must fix the master's
compensation before or after judgment on the basis and terms
stated in the order of appointment unless a new basis and terms
are set after notice and opportunity for hearing.
(2) Payment. The compensation fixed under subdivision (1) must be
paid either:
(A) by a party or parties; or
(B) from a fund or subject matter of the action within the court's
control.
1998] 1617
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(k) Application te Jue Alout mayaent a magistrate
judge as master only for duties that cannot be performed in the
capacity of magistrate judge and only in exceptional circumstances.
A magistrate judge is not eligible for compensation ordered under
subdivision (j).
HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  1618 1997-1998
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COMMITTEE NOTE
Rule 53 is revised extensively to reflect changing practices in using
masters. From the beginning in 1938, Rule 53 focused primarily on spe-
cial masters who perform trial functions. ..... be5"iw er voitsu v
egiate. su pp...n.. ta. Rule 53 continues to address trial masters as
well, and clarifies the provisions that govern the appointment and function
of masters for all purposes. The core of the original Rule 53 remains.
Rule 53 was adapted from equity practice, and reflected a long history of
discontent with the expense and delay frequently encountered in references
to masters. Public judicial officers, moreover, enjoy presumptions of
ability, experience, and neutrality that cannot attach to masters. These
concerns remain important today.
The new provisions reflect the need for care in defining a master's
role. It may prove wise to appoint a single person to perform multiple
master roles. Yet separate thought should be given to each role. Pretrial
and post-trial masters are likely to be appointed more often than trial
masters. The question whether to appoint a trial master is not likely to be
ripe when a pretrial master is appointed. If appointment of a trial master
seems appropriate after completion of pretrial proceedings, however, the
pretrial master's experience with the case may be strong reason to appoint
the pretrial master as trial master. The advantages of experience may be
more than offset, nonetheless, by the nature of the pretrial master's role.
A settlement master is particularly likely to have played roles that are
incompatible with the neutral role of trial master, and indeed may be
effective as settlement master only with clear assurance that the appoint-
ment will not be expanded to trial master duties. r f.simiar reasns
pretrial master or trial master as post-trial master, particularly for tasks that
involve facilitating party cooperation.
Subdivision (a). District judges bear initial and primary responsibility
for the work of their courts. A master should be appointed only if the
parties consent or the master's duties cannot adequately be performed by
an available district judge or magistrate judge of the local district. The
search for a judge need not be pursued by seeking an assignment from out-
side the district.
United States magistrate judges are authorized by statute to perform
many pretrial functions in civil actions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
1998] 1619
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Ordinarily a district judge who delegates these functions should refer them
to a magistrate judge acting as magistrate judge. A magistrate judge is an
experienced judicial officer who has no need to set aside nonjudicial
responsibilities for master duties; the fear of delay that often deters
appointment of a master is much reduced. There is no need to impose on
the parties the burden of paying master fees to a magistrate judge. A
magistrate judge, moreover, is less likely to be involved in matters that
raise conflict-of-interest questions.
Use of masters for the core functions of trial has been progressively
limited. These limits are reflected in the provisions of paragraph (1)(B)
that restrict appointments to exercise the trial functions described in
subdivision (b)(8) and (9). The Supreme Court gave clear direction to this
trend in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); earlier roots
are sketched in Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701
(1927). As to nonjury trials, this trend has developed through elaboration
of the "exceptional condition" requirement in Rule 53(b). This phrase is
retained, and will continue to have the same force as it has developed.
Although the provision that a reference "shall be the exception and not the
rule" is deleted, its meaning is embraced for this setting by the exceptional
condition requirement.
The use of masters in jury-tried cases is retained as well, but the
practice is narrowed even further than former requirements that the issues
be complicated and that reference be the exception. If the master's find-
ings are to be of any use, the master must conduct a preliminary trial that
reflects as nearly as possible the trial that will be conducted before the
jury. This procedure imposes a severe dilemma on parties who believe that
the truth-seeking advantages of the first full trial cannot be duplicated at a
second trial. It also imposes the burden of two trials to reach even the first
verdict. The actual usefulness of the master's findings as evidence also is
open to doubt. It would be folly to ask the jury to consider both the
evidence heard before the master and the evidence presented at trial, as
reflected in the longstanding rule that the master "shall not be directed to
report the evidence." If the jury does not know what evidence the master
heard, however, nor the ways in which the master evaluated that evidence,
it is impossible to appraise the master's findings in relation to the evidence
heard by the jury. It might be better simply to abandon the use of masters
in jury trials. Rather than take this final step, however, room is left for an
exceptional circumstance that requires appointment of a master. Courts
should be very reluctant to conclude that any circumstance is so special as
to require the appointment.
The statute specifically authorizes appointment of a magistrate judge
as special master. § 636(b)(2). In special circumstances, it may be appro-
priate to appoint a magistrate judge as a master when needed to perform
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functions outside those listed in § 636(b)(1). These advantages are most
likely to be realized with trial or post-trial functions. The advantages of
relying on a magistrate judge are diminished, however, by the risk of
confusion between the ordinary magistrate judge role and master duties,
particularly with respect to pretrial functions commonly performed by
magistrate judges as magistrate judges. Party consent is required for trial
before a magistrate judge, moreover, and this requirement should not be
readily undercut by resort to Rule 53. Subdivision (k) requires that appoint-
ment of a magistrate judge as master be justified by exceptional
circumstances.
Despite the advantages of relying on district judges and magistrate
judges to discharge judicial duties, the occasion may arise for appointment
of another person as pretrial master. Appointment of a master is readily
justified if the parties consent. Even then, however, a court is free to
refuse appointment, exercising directly its own responsibilities. Absent
party consent, the most common justifications will be the need for time or
expert skills that cannot be supplied by an available magistrate judge. An
illustration of the need for time is provided by discovery tasks that require
review of numerous documents, or perhaps supervision of depositions at
distant places. Post-trial accounting chores are another familiar example
of time-consuming work that requires little judicial experience. Expert
experience with the subject-matter of specialized litigation may be impor-
tant in cases in which a judge or magistrate judge could devote the required
time. At times the need for special knowledge or experience may be best
served by appointment of an expert who is not a lawyer. .n.At scate
casest itmay a-te t pi e f .a.t.. s .iwho po.. es bth
Matersd r AuC
(This rule does no drs th*e.. difiuties. tha ar-iswe asn
peson is iappointd topdr vdpig oe smse n as. court-
appointed- exer ainssudr vidnc Rule. 706" Topq9 beW,- 4 ef e a
co-ppon ed eerwtnsmand vor-nove 4esoi nur
that resemble. tePows oaprtrial :or postihal master.: q.on sm
Even with a separate app:* .**oin*:*tment, ::'-the.cmiaino oe cah easily
w~nftscn itaebt fGOnctin. expe~r ins WuI "(tst and We
tcross-examined in -Conrt. A* XIAsterutioin as laser ijs -notsuec
len oftesininy outsti. tepen judicia --testgof examint iadcrs.
examin~~~~~~~~~~ation a edgeosndan uejt6beeett, Arss
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role ofrdinmr juillolcr rsn eprec sisIlint t
Masters are subject to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, with
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exceptions spelled out in the Code. Special care must be taken to ensure
that there is no actual or apparent conflict of interest involving a master.
A lawyer, for example, may be involved with other litigation before the
appointing judge or in the same court, directly or through a firm. Terl
.......... p e ig b e a..... la wy e a '
involved in other litigation that involves parties, interests, or lawyers or
firms engaged in the present action. A lawyer or nonlawyer may be com-
mitted to intellectual, social, or political positions that are affected by the
case.
Apart from conflicts of interest, there is ground for concern that
apointments frequently are made in reliance on past experience and per-
sonal acquaintance with the master. The appointing Judge's knowledge of
the master's abilities can provide important assurances not only that the
master can discharge the duties of master but also that the judge and master
can work well together. It also is important, however, to ensure that the
best possible person is found and that opportunities for this public service
are equally open to all. Suggestions by the parties deserve careful
consideration, particularly those made jointly by all parties. Other efforts
as well may prove fruitful, including such devices as consulting profes-
sional organizations if the master may be a nonlawyer.
Subdivision (b). The duties that may be assigned to a master are
loosely grouped as pretrial duties in paragraphs (1) through (7), trial duties
in paragraphs (8) and (9), post-trial duties in paragraphs (10) through (14),
and other duties agreed to by the parties in paragraph (15). These group-
ings should not divert attention from the need to consider the justifications
for assigning each particular duty to a master, and the need for care in
assigning multiple duties to the same master.
Pretrial masters. The appointment of masters to participate in pretrial
proceedings ivy v .he last teo decades s
litgaio2.Reflections of the practice are found in such cases as Burlington
No. R.R. v. Department of Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1991), and
In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985). This practice is not well
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regulated by present Rule 53, which focuses on masters as trial
participants. A careful study has made a convincing case that the use of
masters to supervise discovery was considered and explicitly rejected in
framing Rule 53. See Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special
Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of Authority and Restrictions?, 1983 ABF
Research Journal 143. Rule 53 is amended to confirm th*". thoity
Appoin-.ndto ,.-eg late' t use 0~-rtr mas ers:
Pretrial masters should be appointed only when needed. The parties
should not be lightly subjected to the potential delay and expense of
delegating pretrial functions to a pretrial master. The risk of increased
delay and expense is offset, however, by the possibility that a master can
bring to pretrial tasks time, talent, and flexible procedures that cannot be
provided by judicial officers. Appointment of a master is justified when
a master is likely to substantially advance the Rule 1 goals of achieving the
just, speedy, and economical determination of litigation.
The risk of imposing unfair costs on a party is a particular concern in
determining whether to appoint a pretrial master. Appointment of a trial
master under Rule 53 will be an exceptional event, and a post-trial master
is likely to be appointed only in large-scale litigation in which the costs can
fairly be imposed on parties able to bear them or be paid from a common
fund. Pretrial masters may seem desirable across a broader range of
litigation, more often involving one or more parties who cannot readily
bear the expense of a master. Parties are not required to defray the costs
of providing public judicial officers, and should not lightly be charged with
the costs of providing private judicial officers. Disparities in party
resources are not automatically cured by disproportionate allocations of fee
responsibilities-there is some risk that a master may appear beholden to
a party who pays most or all of the fees. Even when all parties can well
afford master fees, appointment is justified only if the expense is reason-
able in relation to the character and needs of the litigation. Th .havact6r
duct their litigatioami a maner tht fteat t cnum nunar hr
bf the I' it i Id 6.-source fu Judie*i6.fl.. s Consent of all parties
may significantly reduce these concerns, although even then courts should
strive to avoid situations in which consent is constrained by the unavailabil-
ity of reasonable attention from a judge or magistrate judge.
Pretrial masters have been used for a variety of purposes. The list of
powers and duties in paragraphs (1) through (7) is intended to illustrate the
range of appropriate assignments. The only explicit limitation is set out in
paragraph (4), but courts must be careful in assigning pretrial tasks, just
as care must be taken in assigning trial tasks. See LaBuy v. Howes Leather
Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272
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U.S. 701 (1926). y lce: 1~ouki dk hwg
aDirect judicial performance of judicial functions
may be particularly important in cases that involve important public issues
or many parties. n oM a m e -..lut f
fefr. At the. extreme, broad and unreviewed delegations. of pretrial
responsibility can run afoul of Article III. See Stauble v. Warrob, Inc.,
977 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Bituminous Coal Operators 'Assn., 949
F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Burlington No. R.R. v. Department of
Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1991). J.diei.1 t.e
hOweve, an. at. om on.. . aVoato ao, 04e copein demands..
rV.. .........
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advantagea fin prootigesv setlmntheaties maye sharle wiy a aster
ifraltioun mhy oulnt revealtonajdg mayightly trforedy caseo
dhferetfntos tiartianr import nt toton Teeasemb abet fer thatessmests
may bhe caete anl suggestionsato settlement iftht foulcto bsep aprrate
from aotra jug.h prif nee hae byecappore tet diefo
aarapih (1)rconimse frequenrticpactfie ofetrelyinglonimaters o
mei rotherwise aciate settlmen.a master may haveletosevera dl
advntages n prmotgethtfcae settlementelartie ayshaer wit amse
he adnmtant otieront Thasterg may beablor offser. Asmes
ofy thlasteetnixeine and sugsiaufrstteettat wfouldc noat baen popiae
fromha tria judge.s Teprts mayprhae sealespectmafor advice frome
outerwis ntpartyotcsesem, mster may aetoac degelomoels
importance to the value of settling.
Paragraph (2) {refers explicitly to discovery, but includes disclosure
as well} [covers discovery and disclosure duties]. Supervision of discovery
has been one of the tasks most frequently assigned to masters. The need
for a master may be acute in overworked courts presented with claims that
privilege, work-product, or protective order shield thousands of documents
against discovery. A master also may be able to help the parties plan
realistic discovery programs in ways that parallel help in settlement
negotiations, to reduce the tensions of contentious discovery maneuvers, or
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to resolve disputes or even preside at depositions when reason fails. The
limits of the adversary process must, however, be observed. It would be
improper, for example, to appoint a master with "the power to restate the
questions and to recommend the answers," see Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F.2d
66 (10th Cir. 1967). Often the court will retain power to make orders,
directing the master only to make recommendations. Often, however, the
court will prefer to delegate initial power to make discovery and disclosure
orders, retaining review power. The rule permits the court to delegate
power to make many types of orders, but allows only recommendations as
to categories of discovery orders that are closely tied to :party.li.-iy to
.a..4-" 1..it ........... the conduct of trial. Th . .. m. .l.so
may be given p ower to reeomiend more severce sanctions.
Paragraph (3) permits a master to conduct Rule 16 pretrial conferences
and make or recommend pretrial orders. Final pretrial conferences directly
focused on shaping the trial, however, ordinarily should be conducted by
the trial judge. A pretrial master's special experience and knowledge of
the case can be tapped by having the master participate in the conference.
..The*aster..ikii .h ii..h. .mtto mking..cinntoegidations, ra:
than orders, as to pariclal Imprtant. asct o=reral nagen.
Paragraph (4) permits assignment of authority to hear and determine
pretrial motions, with stated exceptions. The listed exceptions are
frequently encountered matters of great importance. It is not possible to
capture in a general list all matters that may be equally important in a
particular case. Trial judges must be careful to retain responsibility for the
initial as well as final decision of all matters central to a case. Hearings
conducted by a master are governed by ordinary court practices of notice,
record, and public access.
Paragraph (5) complements paragraph (4) by permitting reference to
a master for hearings and recommendations for disposition of any motion
described in paragraph (4), including those listed in paragraphs (A) through
(H). Even though the court retains responsibility for independent determi-
nation of matters of law, and can retain responsibility for independent
determination of matters of fact in the order referring the proceedings to
the master, references should be limited to cases presenting special needs.
Courts have frequently noted the undesirability of referring dispositive
motions to masters. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 991
F.2d 1080 (3d Cir. 1993); In re U.S., 816 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1987); In
re Armco, 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985); Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton
Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 711-713 (7th Cir. 1984). An assignment to
recommend disposition of a motion for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction, for example, should be made only if severe con-
straints make it impossible for a judicial officer to provide an opportunity
for effective relief.
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Paragraph (6) is a general authorization to assign authority to manage
pretrial proceedings. This provision reflects the difficulty of foreseeing the
innovative procedures that may evolve under the spur of litigation that is
complex in subject matter, number of parties, or number of related actions.
It also can encompass a variety of alternative dispute resolution devices.
A master might, for example, preside at a summary jury trial. Matters that
bear directly on the conduct of trial, however, are seldom apt to be suitable
for delegation to a pretrial master. See Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts
Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
2131, 2147 n.88 (1989).
Paragraph (7) reflects an emerging practice of relying on masters to
help coordinate separate proceedings that involve the same subject matter.
One form of coordination is to appoint the same person as master in sev-
eral actions. Other, often informal, forms of coordination may be possible
as well. As experience develops with this practice, it may be possible to
achieve many of the benefits of consolidation without the complications that
might arise from attempts to consolidate actions pending in different court
systems.
Trial masters. The policies that have severely restricted-indeed
nearly eliminated-appointment of masters to discharge trial functions are
described with subdivision (a)(1)(B).
The central function of a trial master is to preside over an evidentiary
hearing. This function distinguishes the trial master from most functions
of pretrial and post-trial masters. If any master is to be used for such
matters as a preliminary injunction hearing or a determination of complex
damages issues, for example, the master should be a trial master appointed
under subdivisions (b)(8) or (9). The line, however, is not distinct. A
pretrial master might well conduct an evidentiary hearing on a discovery
dispute, and a post-trial master may often need to conduct evidentiary
hearings on questions of compliance.
Rule 53 has long provided authority to report the evidence without
recommendations in nonjury trials, and has prohibited a master's report of
the evidence in a jury trial. These features are retained. There may be
cases in which a mere report of the evidence is useful to the trial judge,
although responsibility for credibility determinations must prove difficult.
A report of the evidence in a jury trial, on the other hand, would com-
pound unbearably the burdens of the master system. Trial before the
master would be followed by simultaneous jury review of the first trial and
a second trial.
Recommended findings may prove useful in nonjury trials as a focus
for deliberation, leaving the judge free to decide without any required
deference to the master. If a master is ever to be used in a jury-tried case,
recommended findings represent the outer limit of proper authority.
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If a master is to hold an evidentiary hearing .i. -*i"".s, the
most common and sensible practice is to delegate the task of decision as
well as hearing, retaining the power of review. Under subdivision (i), fact
findings are reviewed only for clear error unless a different standard is
specified by the court.
Posr onia a m aster s a y e aoed t nassis te or
to asistging trial teorn co clenedetiay in initu
courts' occaionally haveappi Crentd dicia adjnt5d s to perform ariety
of tasks Amngle e utorizes appointme ofpt-wtnesers
ore te .n io r i e to the co P
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Poast-rinal mas ters Courts have come to rely extensively on masters
to assist in framing and enforcing complex decrees, particularly in institu-
tional reform litigation. Current Rule 53 does not directly address this
practice. Amended Rule 53 authorizes appointme t of post-trial masters
for these and similar purposes.
It may prove desirable to appoint as post-trial master a person who has
served in the same case as a pretrial or trial master. Intimate familiarity
with the case may enable the master to act much more quickly and more
surely. The skills required by post-trial tasks, however, may be signifi-
cantly different from the skills required for earlier tasks. This difference
may outweigh the advantages of familiarity. In particularly complex
litigation, the range of required skills may be so great that it is better to
appoint two or even more persons. The sheer volume of work also may
conduce to appointing more than one person. The additional persons may
be appointed as co-equal masters, as associate masters, or in some lesser
role-one common label is "monitor."
Absent party consent, a post-trial master should be appointed only if
no district judge or magistrate judge is available to perform the master's
duties in adequate fashion. As with other masters, strong reasons must be
found before the parties are forced to pay for the services of private
judicial adjuncts. Masters-except those with prior public judicial
service-ordinarily have little experience with the judicial role. Adding
another layer to the judicial process can easily add to delay as well as cost.
Yet masters may make important contributions. Overburdened courts sim-
ply may not have enough time to tend to all current business. A particu-
larly complex case could absorb far too much of a judge's time, defeating
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the opportunity of litigants in many more ordinary cases to receive prompt
official attention. A master may not only free up judge time but also give
more time to the complex case than a judge could. The master also may
bring to bear specialized training and experience that cannot be matched by
any available judge. If all parties consent to appointment of a master, on
the other hand, the court may freely grant the request if it wishes. Consent
greatly reduces concern for possible burdens of cost, delay, and denial of
direct judicial attention. Of course party consent does not require appoint-
ment of a master. The court may prefer to supervise post-trial matters
directly, particularly in cases that affect broad public interests that may not
be adequately represented by the parties.
Paragraph (10) establishes authority to appoint a master to conduct
ministerial matters of account on terms somewhat different from the pro-
vision in former Rule 53(b). It is not required that the reference be "the
exception and not the rule." This change reflects the restriction of the
appointment to ministerial matterg that do not call for judicial resolution.
More complicated matters, whether referred to as accounting or damages,
should be treated under the trial master provisions of paragraphs (8) or (9)
Paragraph (11) reflects the increasingly frequent practice of using
masters to help frame injunctions. Several factors may combine in differ-
ent proportions to support this practice. Ordinarily the subject is quite
complicated. Often the parties remain at loggerheads even after disposition
of the basic issues of liability, advancing widely different remedy proposals
that offer little help in framing a fair and workable decree. The parties,
moreover, may not adequately represent public interests-even when one
or more parties are public officials or agencies. Frequently expert knowl-
edge is important. If a court-appointed expert has testified at trial, it may
be appropriate to appoint that expert as post-trial master. A party's expert,
however, should not be appointed.
Paragraph (12) authorizes appointment of a master to supervise
enforcement of complex decrees in circumstances that require substantial
investments of time or expert knowledge. M ers also waybe :mpanan
p1. tnei~it~n o~: and may be particularly important when
independent inquiry is needed to supplement adversary presentation. As
with framing the decree, a master also may be important because the par-
ties do not fully represent and protect larger public interests.
It is difficult to translate developing post-trial master practice into
terms that resemble the "exceptional circumstance" requirement of original
Rule 53(b) for trial masters in nonjury cases. The tasks of framing and
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enforcing an injunction may be less important than the liability decision as
a matter of abstract principle, but may be even more important in practical
terms. The detailed decree and its operation, indeed, often provide the
most meaningful definition of the rights recognized and enforced. Great
reliance, moreover, is often placed on the discretion of the trial judge in
these matters, underscoring the importance of direct judicial involvement.
Experience with mid- and late twentieth century institutional reform
litigation, however, has convinced many trial judges and appellate courts
that masters often are indispensable. Apart from requiring that a decree be
"complex," the rule does not attempt to capture these competing considera-
tions in a formula. Reliance on a master is inappropriate when responding
to such routine matters as contempt of a simple decree, see Apex Fountain
Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1096-1097 (3d Cir. 1987).
Reliance on a master is appropriate when a complex decree requires
complex policing, particularly when a party has proved resistant or
intransigent. This practice has been recognized by the Supreme Court, see
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Internat. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
481-482 (1986). Among the many appellate decisions are In re Pearson,
990 F.2d 653 (lst Cir. 1993); Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867 (7th Cir.
1988); NORML v. Mulle, 828 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Armco, Inc.,
770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1985); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 111-112 (3d Cir. 1979); Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d
240, 244-245 (5th Cir. 1979).
Thrgrph 13 cvers -admmrtic o. .. n. aw omlipl
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Paragraph (14) contemplates powers of investigation quite unlike the
traditional role of judicial officers in an adversary system. The master in
the Pearson case, for example, was appointed by the court on its own
motion to gather information about the operation and efficacy of a consent
decree that had been in effect for nearly twenty years. A classic explana-
tion of the need for-and limits on-sweeping investigative powers is pro-
vided in Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1159-1163, 1170-1171 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
Party consent can be helpful in defining the duties of a post-trial
master. Party consent, however, no more controls definition of the
master's duties than it controls the decision whether to appoint a master.
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Other duties. Paragraph (15) emphasizes the importance of party
consent. Just as parties may consent to arbitration, so consent has an
important bearing on the means of processing disputes under judicial
auspices. Party consent reduces concerns about expense and limiting
access to public judges. Courts cannot, however, be asked to abandon all
responsibility for proceedings conducted under their authority or judgments
entered on their rolls. There are many illustrations of settings in which
courts need not-and at times should not-accede to party consent.
Consent of representative parties should be reviewed carefully in class
actions. Arrangements that significantly alter the nature of adversary
litigation also should be undertaken carefully; the use of masters to
organize investigations by the parties, or to become active investigators,
must be approached with caution. Usually it is better that the 'I.
jud: irec y resolve requests for interim relief, such as temporary
restraining orders or preliminary injunctions.
Subdivision (c). The order appointing a pretrial master is vitally
important in informing the master and the parties about the nature and
extent of the master's duties and powers. Care must be taken to make the
order as clear [precise] as possible. The parties must be given notice and
opportunity to be heard on the question whether a master should be
appointed and on the terms of the appointment.
Long experience has demonstrated the danger that appointment of a
master may lengthen, not reduce, the time required to reach judgment.
From the beginning, Rule 53 has included a variety of terms designed to
encourage prompt execution of the master's duties. These provisions are
summarized in the phrase in paragraph (2), carried over from the original
rule, requiring that a master proceed with all reasonable diligence.
Additional assurances are provided by the requirement that deadlines be
set. A party may make a motion to the master or to the court to compel
expeditious action.
The simple requirement that the master be named does not address the
means of selecting the master. Often it will be useful to engage the parties
in the process, inviting nominations and review of potential candidates.
Party involvement may be particularly useful if a pretrial master is
expected to promote settlement. However much the parties are involved,
courts should guard against repetitive selection of a single small group of
familiar candidates.
Precise designation of the master's duties and powers is essential.
There should be no doubt among the master and parties as to the tasks to
be performed and the allocation of powers between master and court to
ensure performance. Clear delineation of topics for any reports or recom-
mendations is an important part of this process. It also is important to
protect against delay by establishing a time schedule for performing the
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assigned duties. Early designation of the procedure for fixing the master's
compensation also may provide useful guidance to the parties. And experi-
ence may show the value of describing specific ancillary powers that have
proved useful in carrying out more generally described duties.
Ex parte communications between master and court present troubling
questions. Often the order should prohibit such communications, assuring
that the parties know where authority is lodged at each step of the
proceedings. Prohibiting ex parte communications also can enhance the
role of a settlement master by assuring the parties that settlement can be
fostered by confidential revelations that would not be shared with the court.
Yet there may be circumstances in which the master's role is enhanced by
the opportunity for ex parte communications. A master assigned to help
coordinate multiple proceedings, for example, may benefit from off-the-
record exchanges with the court about logistical matters. The rule does not
directly regulate these matters. It requires only that the court address the
topic in the order of appointment.
Similarly difficult questions surround ex parte communications
between master and the parties. Ex parte communications may be essential
in seeking to advance settlement. Ex parte communications also may prove
useful in other settings, as with in camera review of documents to resolve
privilege questions. In most settings, however, ex parte communications
with the parties should be discouraged or prohibited. The rule does not
provide direct guidance, but does require that the court address the topic
in the order of appointment.
There should be few occasions for requiring that a master be bonded.
If special circumstances suggest a risk that inadequate performance may
cause significant harm, however, a court may wish to ensure a source of
damage payments. Although a court rule cannot address the question of
official immunity, it is proper to provide for a bond that-in the manner
of an injunction bond furnished under Rule 65(c)-provides a source of
compensation without regard to the possibility of individual liability.
In setting the procedure for fixing the master's compensation, it is
useful at the outset to establish specific guides to control total expense.
The order of appointment should state the basis, terms, and procedures for
fixing compensation. If compensation is to be fixed by an hourly rate, it
may help not only to set the rate but also to set an expected time budget.
When there is an apparent danger that the expense may prove unjustifiably
burdensome to a party or disproportionate to the needs of the case, it also
may help to provide for regular reports on cumulative expenses. The court
has power under subdivision (j) to change the basis and terms for determin-
ing compensation, but should recognize the risk of unfair surprise to the
parties.
The provision for amending the order of appointment is as important
as the provisions for the initial order. New opportunities for useful
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assignments may emerge as the pretrial process unfolds, or even in later
stages of the litigation. Conversely, experience may show that an initial
assignment was too broad or ambitious, and should be limited or revoked.
It even may happen that the first master is ill-suited to the case and should
be replaced. Anything that could be done in the initial order can be done
by amendment.
Subdivision (d). Subdivision (c) requires that the subdivision (b)
duties of the master must be specified in the appointing order. Subdivision
(e) describes the general scope of a master's authority. This subdivision
recognizes that it is not possible to capture in a detailed rule all powers that
may be necessary or appropriate for a master, and confirms the existence
of powers that otherwise would have to be inferred.
Subdivision (e). The general authority of a master described in sub-
division (e) is taken from past practice.
Subdivision (r). The provisions for hearings are taken from present
Rule 53. Stylistic changes have been made. The present rule's detailed
description of the power to compel production of documents is included in
the Rule 45 power to compel production of documents or tangible things,
or inspection of premises. This power to compel production of evidence
may be exercised in advance of a hearing in order to make the hearing as
fair and efficient as possible. It is made clear that the contempt power
referred to in present Rule 53(d)(2) is reserved to the judge, not the
master.
Subdivision (g). A master's order must be filed and entered on the
docket. It must be promptly served on the parties, a task ordinarily
accomplished by mailing as permitted by Rule 5(b). In some circumstances
it may be appropriate to have the clerk's office assist the master in mailing
the order to the parties.
Subdivision (h). The report is the master's primary means of com-
munication with the court. The nature of the report determines the need
to file relevant exhibits, transcripts, and evidence. A report at the
conclusion of unsuccessful settlement efforts, for example, often will stand
alone. A report recommending action on a motion for summary judgment,
on the other hand, should be supported by all of the summary judgment
materials. Given the wide array of tasks that may be assigned to a pretrial
master, there may be circumstances that justify sealing a report against
public access-a report on continuing or failed settlement efforts is the
most likely example. A post-trial master may be assigned duties in formu-
lating a decree that deserve similar protection. Sealing is much less likely
to be appropriate with respect to a trial master's report. ..... ef .h
possibility of reportig on matters noet specifically delegated to the master
dees not imply a broad licznse to exceed the bounds of the court'
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the master of ieporant mattrs that should be brdought to the corts
attention. A fo~mal report, available to the paities, may be the best mnea
of highighting these maters.
Ard mater maycin toear sfeekin aoptidn the- reoft, arefmprtnt.They are not rems Thqestiuon te r ho-sute mears thayproperly be brought t tohe Wr rs attenton Mater eain t seviewproeedings, hr. ..m e. .o t e eo fre to eeku Othe
findings of fact. ,v 1 ... ........ ;..... .. ,,matters may deserve diff n tr haame famat n conld t  some-
thing should be brough te the cour-ts $attention. rdindaril toe povid
should be inform-ed Of the en ts roporet
Subdi vision i). The time limits for seeking review of a master's
order, or objecting to-or seeking adoption of-a report, are important.
They are not jurisdictional. The subordinate role of a master means that
although a court may properly refuse to entertain untimely review
proceedings, there must be power to excuse the failure to seek timely
review.
The clear error test provides the presumptive standard of review for
findings of fact. The clearn errorfe phrase is used in plare of the cleary
erroneous standard of Rule 52 to suggest the subtle distinctions- that may
justify somewhat more searehnce o f a master. The 'clearly
erroneous" r se.is.as....................... ... . s t.............. A isl
accont ay e tkenof he acttha th reticnsb~ btween a court an-
mate i nt hesae sthe reaIohi betwe en .an, apelate court and
a trial court- A court may provide a more demanding standard of review
in the order of appointment. The order should be amended to provide
more searching review only for compelling reasons. Special characteristics
of the case that suggest more searching review ordinarily should be appar-
ent at the time of appointment, and action at that time avoids any concern
that the standard may have been changed because of dissatisfaction with the
master's result. In addition, the parties may rely on the standard of review
in proceedings before the master. A court may not provide for less search-
ing review without the consent of the parties; clear error review marks the
outer limit of appropriate deference to a master. Parties who wish to
expedite proceedings, however, may stipulate that the master's findings will
be final.
.The.*use o6. f matr nji ae sdsor~dby stibdivisloO
(b)(Zfl). matrsfnig antb idn nthe jury, t*ndb- ma
c~niie heuY- ias to'any fndin Aoteste y~piy The.cutms
xcueayfindig thAt is** afece blea rosanmyintsisretio
e.ld an..ndu.. .f a.. ..n.n ... ...f i ssmt s admittedlin evideneA& nd
no other eavi.dence is adite on that .is=ue . fgmet shouwd .%e .:entered a
matter of 1av* at ta su.f teeidnesaditted the finding
is o b trate asanyothr e Ifc otheaeisue, anoe"" afc
the.. ...de .f ..r...n
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Absent consent of the parties, questions of law cannot be delegated for
final resolution by a master. The subordinate role of the master may at
times warrant treating as questions of law matters that would be treated as
questions of fact on reviewing a trial court.
Apart from factual and legal questions, masters often may make deter-
minations that, when made by a trial court, would be treated as matters of
procedural discretion. The subordinate and ad hoc character of the master
often will justify more searching review or de novo determination by a
judge. .......... .. tT . t ng .....
aut.........oaasrw l ..... e... co:nt ep .d.tive o.worse
!uere!ise de! .. i.If an "abuse of discretion" standard is used,
the master's discretion is less broad than the discretion of a judge as to
comparable matters. The rule does not catalogue these matters or attempt
to suggest more specific standards of review. The court may, for the guid-
ance of the parties and master, establish standards for specific topics in the
order appointing the master. Ordinarily, however, the standard of re-e
will be detrmined during the review proceess. .T..e sid"R..f "ie
Subdivision (. The need to pay compensation is a substantial reason
for care in appointing private persons as masters. The burden can be
reduced to some extent by recognizing the public service element of the
master's office. One court has endorsed the suggestion that an attorney-
master should be compensated at a rate of about half that earned by private
attorneys in commercial matters. Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607
F.2d 737, 746 (6th Cir. 1979). Even if that suggestion is followed, a
discounted public-service rate can impose substantial burdens. Payment f
.: . .d ......
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ttee,~ ~~~ so tle-nrt ...Tor, A3:P~Qs WA1 P-.M.S..ii~~i~aiwhat .... b.or vTo hes a .. ne tht. apitd. b S ehlon the basr hand tm prorly be stared  r a maj 10 t1in of the
oderof appohetment undereubdvision )((n tAwI :.a dor thatis pf
tolr tpheso initial bu ayd term. ae noicefo and oporunt ofo arigt portion of aaanse unaor.t inormed .. ni airIt i hangd however, It may bteenf to onfuse tayheols of
maithae basis and mser ixny comenstiihoud be statedinah
udvsincs . this sbvi iesi war.d etcad hoeers tor emphize thmeneetio houbsaei the lso
magistrate judge and master only when justified by exceptional
circumstances. See the Note to Subdivision (a).
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